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Abstract
Does the need to find a quantum theory of gravity imply that the
gravitational field must be quantized? Physicists working in quantum
gravity routinely assume an affirmative answer, often without being
aware of the metaphysical commitments that tend to underlie this
assumption. The ambition of this article is to probe these commitments
and to analyze some recently adduced arguments pertinent to the issue
of quantization. While there exist good reasons to quantize gravity, as
this analysis will show, alternative approaches to gravity challenge the
received wisdom. These renegade approaches do not regard gravity as
a fundamental force, but rather as effective, i.e. as merely supervening
on fundamental physics. I will urge that these alternative accounts at
least prove the tenability of an opposition to quantization.
1 Introduction
All major approaches to quantum gravity endorse, implicitly or explicitly,
the view that gravity must be “quantized” in order to be amenable to a
description at the fundamental level. To be sure, different approaches pro-
pose to execute this task in radically different manners. But they agree
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in that without a quantization of gravity no consistent quantum theory of
gravity will be forthcoming. What such a quantization involves will vary
with the approach taken. But rather than analyzing what is meant by
“quantization”—be it some definite procedure for converting a classical field
into a quantum field, or the discreteness of spacetime ab initio—I shall focus
on the intriguing foundational issues that arise in the context of motivating
and justifying such a quantization of gravity.
Callender and Huggett (2001a, 2001b) have sensibly suggested to distin-
guish between the two separate issues of motivating the quest for a quantum
theory of gravity on the one hand and motivating the quantization of the
gravitational field on the other. The first problem can be expressed by ask-
ing “why do we need a quantum theory of gravity at all?”, and the second,
assuming that the first one was answered in the affirmative, by inquiring
“why do we have to quantize gravity for the purpose of finding a quantum
theory of gravity?”. It may seem that these two questions can hardly be kept
separate since quantum field theory requires that all matter fields be quan-
tized and general relativity teaches that those matter fields are the sources
for the gravitational field. Whether or not the two questions collapse into
one depends on whether it will turn out to be possible that quantum matter
fields coexist with the classical, i.e. non-quantized, gravitational field. Since
at least some approaches to gravity, the so-called semi-classical theories, in-
sist that such coexistence is indeed possible, distinguishing the two questions
will help to map the debate.
So why do we need a quantum theory of gravity? A strong, but neverthe-
less often nebulous, desire to present a unified theoretical framework at the
level of fundamental physics populates the folklore of physicists and often
fuels the search for a quantum theory of gravity. Arguments to this effect,
relying—if made explicit at all—on metaphysical considerations, typically
elicit some principles of unity of nature or of scientific method. Although
general relativity and quantum theory may be so disparate as to disallow the
formal deduction of contradictions, they are generally taken to be incom-
mensurable (families of) theories. A quantum theory of gravity is expected
to remedy this theoretical schism and to bolster attempts at finding the
Holy Grail of physics, a unified framework of all interactions. The argument
from unification—unification for the sake of unification—does not, however,
sway the sceptic. The “disunitist” would certainly be free to respond that
at the very least, it may just as well be the case that the conceptual dis-
unity of the two theories reflects a disunity in nature. Despite its rare
explicit articulation and its questionable metaphysical strength, the unifica-
tory impetus provides an extremely important motivation for attempts at
2
quantizing gravity.1
But it suffices to imply the resources of physics itself to find perfectly
valid objectives to do quantum gravity. Extant theoretical physics strongly
motivates the search for a quantum theory of gravity by itself and thus
dispenses with the need to invoke metaphysical unitism. General relativity
conceives of gravity as a dynamical field capturing the gravitational dance of
classical matter, while quantum theory maintains that all dynamical fields
must be quantized, i.e. that all matter is quantum. Although this tension
may be mostly dormant at the energies that are currently experimentally
accessible, there are situations where the interaction between the matter
fields qua quantum fields and the gravitational field becomes pertinent. For
example, physically realistic cosmological models generically predict an ini-
tial singularity. At this singularity, classical physics breaks down and it is
assumed that a quantum theory of gravity, i.e. a theory combining general
relativity with quantum physics, will be necessary to probe the physics of
the early universe.
Given the lack of empirical indications that a quantum theory of gravity
is necessary to correctly describe the physics in these exotic regimes, one
might be inclined to dismiss the endeavor as mathematical recreation. So
far, the only empirical input is extremely indirect at best, involving an
uncomfortably large number of substantial auxiliary hypotheses to relate the
data to Planck scale physics. But despite the fact that the energies required
to probe the Planck scale directly continue to be out of reach, a growing
number of research groups studies the phenomenology of quantum gravity.
In particular, data pertinent to the detection of the breaking of Lorentz
symmetry, which some claim is implied by some approaches to quantum
gravity, is currently under scrutiny (see Jacobson et al. 2003). It certainly
seems that impending empirical input might very soon substantiate the need
for a quantum theory of gravity.
Notwithstanding some potential reservations regarding the empirical ac-
cessibility, the need for a theory merging quantum theory and general rela-
tivity is universally acknowledged. Opinions part, however, when the floor
is opened to discussions as to how the problem of constructing such a theory
must be approached. This essay contends that there are powerful arguments
which strongly suggest that gravity should indeed be quantized. Terno’s re-
sult in particular, to be discussed in Section 2, provides such an argument.
The same section also deals with what is probably the most common litany
1Mattingly (1999) discusses some stipulated or implied unity principles and relates it
to the unity of science debate in philosophy of science.
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defending the necessity of a discrete spacetime structure. I analyze one of
its best expressions—the one due to Doplicher and collaborators—and con-
clude that it begs the questions. Common to both Terno’s and Doplicher’s
arguments is their attempt of solely drawing on resources from physical the-
ories and their mathematical apparatus rather than relying on metaphysical
or aesthetic principles. These arguments favorable to quantization will be
contrasted in Section 3 with two alternative approaches to quantum gravity
which do not involve quantization and by their mere existence establish the
contingency of the quantization of gravity. My conclusions follow in Section
4.
2 Why quantize gravity?
Assuming then that the need for a quantum theory of gravity has been estab-
lished, does gravity necessarily have to be quantized in such a theory? I con-
cur with Callender and Huggett (2001a, 2001b) and with Mattingly (1999)
that this question must be answered in the negative. The mere existence
of approaches to quantum gravity which do not involve the quantization of
gravity implies that quantization is a contingent matter. Any semi-classical
theory of quantum gravity, which supplies the wedge that Callender and
Huggett drive between the two disparate questions of whether we need a
quantum theory of gravity and of whether such a need implies the quan-
tization of gravity, constitutes such an approach. In its simplest form, the
theory stipulates the coupling of the classical gravitational field to the quan-
tum fields of matter. The Einstein equations are modified by exchanging the
classical energy-momentum density Tµν with its expectation value given the
quantum state of matter ψ, i.e. we have the semi-classical Einstein equations
Gµν = 8pi〈ψ|Tµν |ψ〉, (1)
where the Gµν characterize the spacetime geometry. Thus, quantum mat-
ter can be coupled to the classical spacetime geometry via the “classical”
quantity 〈ψ|Tµν |ψ〉. Semi-classical quantum theories of gravity may or may
not include quantum backreactions, i.e. quantum fluctuations induced on
the (classical) gravitational field by its coupling to the quantum fields of
matter. Those which lack quantum backreactions yield cosmological mod-
els which are much too uniform as compared to observations (Boucher and
Taschen 1988, 3525). Those which include them, face the problem of con-
sistenly combining two dynamical sectors, following the classical Einstein
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and the quantum Schro¨dinger evolution respectively. Furthermore, as will
be discussed in Section 2.2, they are subject to Terno’s no-go result.
There is, overall, little doubt that in the final quantum theory of gravity
it will be quantized, but the question will ultimately have to be settled on
empirical grounds. Thus, the main conclusion of Callender and Huggett
stands. However, their investigation is too narrow in that it is confined
to Eppley and Hannah’s classic, but somewhat obsolete argument. Epp-
ley and Hannah (1977) have argued that gravity must be quantized on the
basis that the interaction of a classical gravitational field with a quantum
field leads to contradictions with trusted physical principles. Callender and
Huggett detect some loopholes in the argumentation of Eppley and Hannah
and consequently discount it as incomplete. My main reservation against
Eppley and Hannah stems from their argument’s dependence on the inter-
pretation of quantum mechanics. Even if there were no loopholes at all, I
urge, any argument based on one specific, highly controversial interpretation
of quantum mechanics—the collapse interpretation in this case—suffers by
extension. In toto, of course, I concur with Callender and Huggett in that
Eppley and Hannah’s case for quantization remains inconclusive.
Here, I propose to undertake an analysis of some more recent, and, I
believe, more powerful, arguments that have been brought forth on both
sides.
2.1 Non-commutative spacetime operators
The most popular argument for the non-commutativity of the spacetime co-
ordinates and for the discreteness of spacetime dates back to Snyder (1947)
and has found a famous expression in Doplicher et al. (1995). This dis-
creteness encapsulates the quantum nature of spacetime or, equivalently, of
the gravitational field. Doplicher and collaborators have argued that the
quantum uncertainty relations of the spacetime coordinates emerge from
the combination of Heisenberg’s principle with general relativity. The argu-
ment, as I interpret it, should contain two main parts: the first shows that
continuous spacetime loses its operational meaning at small scales already
at the semi-classical level; the second would extend the argument to full
quantum gravity by defending that this operational limit is due to the truly
discrete nature of spacetime at Planck scale.
The first part of the argument encodes a rather common belief that
the combination of the uncertainty relations and classical general relativity
imposes restrictions on the operational meaning of classical spacetime. The
reasoning runs along the following lines. If
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1. the greater the accuracy (or, equivalently, the smaller the uncertainty)
in the measurement of spatio-temporal coordinates, the stronger the
gravitational field generated by the measurement, and
2. an increasing gravitational field eventually becomes strong enough as
to collapse to a black hole, creating a closed trapped surface, and thus
prevents any signal from leaving the region at stake, and
3. an operational meaning can only be attached to a spacetime localiza-
tion in case signals can leave the region measured,
then a localization measurement is operationally restricted to a certain max-
imum accuracy, or minimum uncertainty. The third premise is merely a def-
inition of operational meaning and does not seem to be either problematic
or substantial. The first two premises, on the other hand, are those that
procure the mileage. The second premise epitomizes how gravity determines
the causal structure of spacetime. This is an immediate consequence of clas-
sical general relativity and deserves all the credit that general relativity does.
The first premise is a rather direct consequence of combining Heisenberg’s
uncertainty principle with the principles of general relativity. According to
the uncertainty principle, measuring a spacetime coordinate with accuracy
1/E generates an uncertainty E in the associated momentum. Thus, an
uncontrollable energy of the order E is concentrated in the region to be
localized. According to general relativity, the energy-momentum density
Tµν associated with this energy deforms the geometry of the spacetime, as
encoded in Einstein’s unmodified field equations Gµν = 8piTµν . Note that
the first two premises are implied by basic principles of well-trusted physical
theories. While this certainly does not make them unassailable, our reasons
for rejecting them would have to be substantial enough to challenge first
principles of two of the most successful achievements of twentieth-century
physics: quantum mechanics and general relativity.
One may argue, however, that these first principles will naturally be
challenged at the level of quantum gravity. The fact that attempts to com-
bine quantum mechanics with general relativity unveil their conceptual in-
commensurability can be taken to imply that some of their first principles
must be violated in quantum gravity. In a sense, then, quantum mechan-
ics and general relativity when combined already contain the seeds of their
own destruction. Thus, one cannot expect that all principles that underpin
the above premises will still be valid in full quantum gravity. But if not
all premises hold, then the argument will of course collapse. Because the
source energy associated with Tµν is quantum and the argument as given is
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thus strictly semi-classical, the objection could conclude, it may very well
turn out that the discreteness emerges only as an artefact of the manner
in which quantum mechanics and general relativity were combined at the
semi-classical level. Therefore, the argument as given so far must be comple-
mented by a second part asserting that the operationally discrete spacetime
at the semi-classical level results from an underlying discreteness at the fun-
damental Planck level.
Unfortunately, Doplicher and his collaborators do not provide such an
addition. But neglecting to take this second leg seriously amounts to beg-
ging the question. It is undoubtedly true that if spacetime is discrete at
the Planck level, it is reasonable to expect some signatures of this discrete-
ness to surface at the semi-classical level. But the converse is not true,
exactly because some or all of the premises made above may no longer ob-
tain in full quantum gravity. The argument as it stands will hence not make
any converts. Despite its appealing reliance on deeply entrenched physical
principles, the argument thus falls short of proving that spacetime must be
discrete (or, similarly, that gravity must be quantized) from the resources
of trusted physical theories alone.
But the question then becomes how any argument drawing solely on
accepted physical theories can possibly establish that gravity must be quan-
tized. If a quantum theory of gravity would be part of the established corpus
of theories, the proof would be easy. But alas, it is not! The failure of cur-
rent physics to offer a straightforward and unique path to a quantum theory
of gravity strongly suggests that the formulation of such a theory will re-
quire new physics. In this case, however, one cannot accept an argument
from the resources of current physics alone to the effect that gravity must
be quantized.
2.2 Inconsistency of quantum-classical dynamics
Despite this limitation of arguments relying on principles of accepted physics,
some ways of constructing a quantum theory of gravity without quantiza-
tion can still be excluded. Building on earlier results, Terno (2004) has
brought forth an argument which seems to preclude the possibility of a con-
sistent semi-classical quantum theory of gravity which includes quantum
backreactions. Consider a system consisting of two sectors, one governed
by quantum field theory (the quantum sector), and a classical sector de-
scribed by so-called Koopmanian dynamics. Koopmanian dynamics offers a
generalized formalism that allows to cast a classical system in the mathe-
matical formalism of a quantum theory, i.e. as a Hamiltonian system living
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in a Hilbert space. The conjugate variables of the classical sector will be
represented by commuting multiplication operators, as opposed to the non-
commuting operators of the quantum sector. Furthermore, assume that the
hybrid dynamics of the combined classical-quantum system is described by
a unitary evolution on the joint Hilbert space H = Hq ⊗Hc.
Terno shows that if we include terms with unobservable classical oper-
ators in the interaction part of the unitary operator, then the equations of
motion of the combined system will no longer exhibit formal equivalence with
the purely classical or the purely quantum equations of motion. But such a
formal correspondence is required, he argues, in order to obtain the correct
classical limit that is expected to hold for the combined system. Therefore,
he continues, the interaction part can only contain observable classical oper-
ators. If this is the case, he concludes, the quantum sector cannot influence
the classical sector, thus precluding quantum backreactions. Even under
these relatively weak assumptions it thus turns out to be impossible to de-
fine a mixed system with a hybrid dynamics that consistently includes the
full interaction between the two sectors. The looming inconsistency that
would arise when quantum backreactions are included in the interaction
part of the evolution operator is that the system would exhibit an incorrect
classical limit.
Although Terno’s result also inhabits the semi-classical realm, I main-
tain that this does not render it vulnerable to the above charges as it did
the preceding argument. The reason is simple: it does not compound two
theories on whose principles it relies, but only offers a no-go result using a
general formalism and invoking the unitarity of the combined evolution as
well as the requirement for a quantum theory of gravity to possess the cor-
rect classical limit. These principles, it seems, constitute general desiderata
for constructing theories rather than axioms of a specific theory that may
become redundant as the theory is superseded. A full quantum theory of
gravity is thus likely to also be subjected to these requirements. Insofar as
Terno’s assumptions transcend particular theories, they are immune to the
objections aired above.
3 Why not quantize gravity?
Terno’s result precludes the possibility of formulating a consistent semi-
classical quantum theory of gravity including full quantum backreactions.
But there exist more promising alternative approaches that offer quantum
theories of gravity which do not involve a quantization of the gravitational
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field and, I will argue, escape Terno’s no-go theorem. Typically, they un-
derstand gravity as an induced rather than a fundamental force. According
to this view, gravity is not one of the four fundamental forces; instead, it
emerges at a higher level as a result of the fundamental physics. For ex-
ample, Lorentz (1899-1900) suggested that Newtonian gravity could be a
residual net force supervenient on the electromagnetic force. In this section,
I expose two newer proposals which, at least to some extent, do not regard
gravity as a fundamental force. For them, since gravity is not fundamental,
it does not have to be quantized. Thus, they provide quantum theories of
gravity while denying the necessity of its quantization.
The reader may wonder why I wish to label these approaches as quantum
theories of gravity. Obviously, they do not constitute theories of gravity qua
quantum field. But even so, they offer a resolution of the conceptual tension
between quantum theory and general relativity and promise to restitute an
account of those astrophysical phenomena which led us to quest for a quan-
tum theory of gravity in the first place. Hence, they solve the problem that
required a quantum theory of gravity—a combination of quantum theory
and general relativity—, and shall thus be termed as such.
3.1 Sakharov’s induced gravity
Most prominently, perhaps, among these alternative approaches is Sakha-
rov’s induced gravity theory. As it has recently been resurrected, it deserves
particular attention.2 It claims to ingest Lorentz’s vision of the possibility
of gravity merely being an effective force induced by residual electromag-
netic forces. For Sakharov, gravity is thus not a fundamental physical field,
but “induced”, i.e. emergent from quantum field theory like hydrodynamics
emerges from molecular physics. Nota bene, since the interaction part of
the action contains both classical and quantum terms, Sakharov’s account
leads to a type of semi-classical quantum gravity.
The general framework for an induced gravity theory in Sakharov’s vein
is set up by first assuming a Lorentzian manifold as a background on which
to do quantum field theory. This background is a continuous, classical,
unquantized spacetime. It is left free “to flap in the breeze”, i.e. no assump-
tions regarding its dynamical evolution are made. In particular, no Einstein
equations—modified or not—enter the picture. When we do quantum field
theory on this background spacetime, it turns out that the effective action
2The original paper is Sakharov ([1967/8] 2000). There is a modern recast by Visser
(2002). Sakharov’s original article had almost 320 citations in high energy physics as of
September 2004, of which 24 in 2003 alone.
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at the one-loop level automatically contains terms proportional to the cos-
mological constant and to the Einstein-Hilbert action of general relativity,
as well as higher order terms. Thus, it looks as if Einstein gravity will be
generated at the one-loop level from the interaction of quantum fields.
It may be instructive to note that gravity was not really created ex ni-
hilo. At the bare minimum, a Lorentzian background manifold was assumed.
Furthermore, the geometry of the background manifold acted as an exter-
nal field for the quantum fields living on the background manifold. Terms
encoding the geometry of the classical background thus cohabited in the
Lagrangian of the effective action with the terms of the quantum fields. To
the extent to which the background geometry was preseupposed, arguably,
the gravitational degree of freedom, but not its dynamics, was put into the
theory from the start. The next step, the variation of the effective action
with respect to its variables then automatically leads to the semi-classical
Einstein equations (1). While the fact that the Einstein-Hilbert action is
mimicked at the one-loop level is very suggestive, it is unclear whether this
framework is sufficient to fully recover gravity. But it is important to note
that gravity, although arguably not fully “induced”, was not quantized,
as the geometry was assumed to be classical. Furthermore, the approach
avoids Terno’s prohibition of a semi-classical theory of gravity with quan-
tum backreactions. Since no dynamical assumptions were made regarding
the classical background (the classical sector), i.e. no classical dynamics im-
posed on the classical sector, the gravitational action is induced from the
mutual interaction of the underlying quantum fields. The classical sector
acts as a mere background and does not interact with the quantum sector.
Therefore, no hybrid dynamics is necessitated in this approach.
Interestingly, there exist reverse efforts of constructing a fundamental
quantum theory of gravity, subsumed under the heading “non-commutative
geometry”, which assume only gravity to be a fundamental force and derive
the standard model of electromagnetic, weak, and strong forces from grav-
ity. However widespread and persuasive the belief in a fundamental theory
containing gravity as a fundamental force may be, currently available ob-
servations and experiments only license inferences regarding the same semi-
classical realm that Sakharov’s approach describes. Not unlike the belief in
the unity of nature, the belief in a fundamental theory including gravity is
exposed by Sakharov as an additional commitment not warranted by the
resources of empirical physics alone.
10
3.2 Jacobson’s gravitational thermodynamics
More recently, Jacobson (1995) has offered a perspective that also cautioned
against quantizing the Einstein equations. Rather than deriving the four
laws of black hole thermodynamics from the classical Einstein equations,
as did Bardeen, Carter, and Hawking (1973), Jacobson inverts the deriva-
tion by recovering the Einstein equations from the proportionality of entropy
and horizon surface area of a black hole together with the fundamental ther-
modynamical relation δQ = TdS, connecting heat Q, temperature T , and
entropy S. The heat is interpreted as the energy flux across a causal horizon
and the temperature as the Unruh temperature relative to an accelerated
observer just inside a local Rindler horizon. This heat manifests itself via the
gravitational field it generates. Like in conventional thermodynamics, where
heat is interpreted as energy flux between unobservable degrees of freedom,
the underlying mechanics of the energy flux is irrelevant. Assuming cos-
mic censorship, Jacobson formulates local gravitational thermodynamics for
an observer by means of the boundary of her past (her “causal horizon”),
associating this boundary with entropy. The system that radiates heat is
identified with the degrees of freedom behind the horizon, separated from
the observer’s past by a causality barrier and is therefore unobservable.
As Jacobson shows, this interpretation imposes conditions on the cur-
vature of spacetime such that the classical Einstein equations are implied.
Therefore, he suggests that the Einstein equations can be more adequately
analogized with the wave equation for sound in a medium, rather than inter-
preted as the dynamical equations for a fundamental field. These equations,
he urges, as higher-level equations of state, should then not be quantized as
if the gravitational field were fundamental, despite the fact that they may
describe what is ultimately a quantum reality.
Like in Sakharov’s approach, gravity does not represent a fundamental
force. Rather, it emerges as a phenomenon supervenient on the energy flux
from causally inaccessible degrees of freedom. Again, Terno’s result does not
apply. However, Jacobson’s claim that gravity should not be quantized in
this scheme because it represents a collective, higher-order degree of freedom
is simply false. Physicists routinely quantize collective degrees of freedom
such as sound (with “phonons” as quanta of sound). Whether or not a
degree of freedom must be quantized or not does not depend on whether it
is collective or individual, but on altogether different considerations. Hence,
quantization cannot necessarily be escaped by Jacobsonian gravity; but it
is not forced on it either.
Jacobson’s incipient program, unfortunately, has so far not been worked
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out in any detail. It remains to be seen, therefore, whether it will be able to
offer a full picture of the workings of gravity. If it will be successful in this
undertaking, then the quantizers of gravity may have met a challenge.
4 Conclusion
This paper has analyzed four arguments pertinent to the issue of whether
gravity must be quantized in a final quantum theory of gravity, two on
each side of the debate. The argument exemplified by Doplicher and col-
laborators, prevalent in the physics community—as far as the community
is concerned with the issue at all—, has been shown to be incomplete. It
was charged with lacking a part establishing that the operationally dis-
crete spacetime results from an underlying discreteness at the Planck scale.
Next, I have accepted Terno’s argument as a proof of the impossibility of
constructing a consistent semi-classical theory including truly hybrid dy-
namics. I insisted, however, that it does not rule out accounts where gravity
is not a fundamental, but only an effective force.
Sakharov’s induced gravity program provides an effective, semi-classical
approach to gravity that does not require a quantization of gravity. Simi-
larly, Jacobson’s gravitational thermodynamics conceives of gravity as emer-
gent from the energy flux of unobservable degrees of freedom. Again, no
quantization was necessary. Although regret must be expressed that these
accounts are but nascent attempts to understand gravity and that they are
therefore yet lacking in many respects, they establish that it is at least
conceivable that the final theory of gravity may not involve quantization.
The question of whether the gravitational field must be quantized in
a full quantum theory of gravity thus turns out to be more subtle than is
commonly assumed. Once stripped from its endemic folkore, the field affords
a wide variety of arguments drawing on the resources of physical theories.
None of these arguments can, by itself, claim conclusiveness. But they all
promise to address a multitude of foundational issues encountered in the
Herculean task of formulating a quantum theory of gravity.
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